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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyzes the impact of financial leverage on performance of listed firms in 
Vietnam, where ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are used as proxies for firm performance. 
Different empirical models are applied to test the relationship between capital structure and 
performance of non-financial firms and banks separately. In addition, this study also takes 
the 2008 global financial crisis into consideration when conducting empirical regressions.  
 
Financial data of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms during the period from 2008 to 2016 
is mainly employed from the database Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS, data for bank-specific 
variables in the same period is extracted from official annual reports of listed banks in 
Vietnam. Moreover, The World Bank’s database is used to collect data for Vietnamese GDP 
and inflation rate, which represent for macroeconomic variables.  
 
Empirical results from panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions reveal a negative 
relationship between financial leverage and performance of Vietnamese non-financial firms. 
Regarding banks, financial leverage has a negative impact on bank’s ROA but positively 
affects bank’s ROE. These outcomes remain unchanged when the 2008 financial crisis is 
taken into account.  
 
To solve the endogeneity problem, this paper uses the two-step system generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator. The negative effect of capital structure on performance of 
non-financial firms in Vietnam is confirmed. However, results for listed banks become 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: capital structure, financial leverage, firm performance, financial crisis,    
Vietnam. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Capital structure and the effect of capital structure on firm performance is a matter of great 
concern in finance. Throughout the history of financial theories, there are various studies 
associated with capital structure such as the M&M theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), the 
trade-off theory (Myers, 1984), the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The M&M theory can be considered as the 
foundation theory in this area, which states that in a perfectly efficient market, firm’s value 
is irrelevant to its capital structure. However the assumptions of a fully efficient market is 
supposed to be unrealistic. Therefore, taking the imperfection of capital market into account, 
the trade-off theory argues that firms can achieve an optimal debt to equity ratio to maximize 
its value by trading-off the advantages and disadvantages of debt financing, where 
advantages of debt come from the tax shield effect and the disadvantages come from financial 
distress. Based on information asymmetry phenomenon, the pecking order theory introduces 
a financial hierarchy among three sources of funds in the order of retained earnings, debt and 
equity. Finally, the agency theory claims that a value-maximizing capital structure can be 
obtained by balancing conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and creditors. 
However, despite great contributions to finance sector, these theories are still based on many 
strict assumptions and so lack of practicality. Hence, there are plenty of empirical studies 
have been conducted to test the real impact of capital structure on firm performance in 
different markets. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
Due to special features of Vietnamese economy, before the economic reforms in 1986, capital 
structure was not an important matter in corporation management because most of enterprises 
in Vietnam are owned and funded by the government. However, until the formation of the 
Vietnamese stock market in 2000, more and more companies start to equitize and call for 
capital from external sources. Therefore capital management becomes a big issue. Yet, young 
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corporations in Vietnam are still inexperienced in making effective capital structure decisions 
(World Bank, 2012), leaving a question whether there is a close relationship between capital 
structure and performance of Vietnamese companies. Thus, to provide an appropriate answer 
to this question, this paper will conduct empirical analyses to check the impact of financial 
leverage on profitability of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
 
In addition, financial system in Vietnam is still bank-centered, which means a very essential 
role of banks in Vietnamese economy. Therefore, this paper also examines the effectiveness 
of Vietnamese listed banks in using different sources of capital. Moreover, because study 
period in this paper includes the stage of the 2008 global financial crisis, the link between 
financial leverage and firm performance during crisis will be investigated.  
 
In short, this paper will test the following hypotheses: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: financial leverage significantly affects performance of non-financial 
listed firms in Vietnam. 
 Hypothesis 2: financial leverage significantly affects performance of listed banks in 
Vietnam. 
 Hypothesis 3: during the 2008 crisis, financial leverage significantly affects 
performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam. 
 Hypothesis 4: during the 2008 crisis, financial leverage significantly affects 
performance of listed banks in Vietnam. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
The rest of this paper will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces core theoretical 
framework related to this topic and chapter 3 discusses about literature review. Chapter 4 
will mention about institutional environment in Vietnam. Data selection and methodology 
will be outlined in chapter 5. Chapter 6 reports empirical results and chapter 7 concludes.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter begins with the definition of capital structure, the distinction between equity 
financing and debt financing, then followed by the introduction of capital structure theories 
including the Modigliani & Miller theory, the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and 
the agency theory.  
 
 
2.1. Definition of capital structure 
 
The capital structure of a company is generally defined as the combination of its equity and 
debt which are commonly shown on the right hand side of the company’s balance sheet. 
Normally, companies finance their assets, daily operations and investment projects for future 
growth by equity from owners/shareholders and/or by debt borrowing from outsiders. If a 
firm only uses equity to cover its activities, it is recognized as an unlevered firm; conversely, 
a mixing of both equity and debt in the firm’s capital structure determines a levered firm. 
Moreover, there is also another element of capital structure called hybrid securities, which 
consist of characteristics of both equity and debt.  
 
Equity financing and debt financing are different in terms of the way firms receive capital 
and return money back to investors. To finance a firm’s activities by equity, usually, there 
are two options: the firm can retain its earnings or issue new shares of stocks. Firm’s stocks 
are normally categorized into two types: common stock and preferred stock. The difference 
between these types of stock is that in case of company liquidation and dividend distribution, 
preferred stock shareholders will receive assets before common stock shareholders.  
However, according to Quiry & Vernimmen (2005), whether preferred stock or common 
stock, there is no guarantee for the shareholders in general, which means that in the case of 
bankruptcy, shareholders are always in the bottom of the line to receive compensation and 
face the risk of losing all the money invested in the company. The higher priorities belong to 
bondholders and creditors. In return, if the firm’s assets increase in value, the value of stocks 
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are able to surpass the initial invested amount of money. Therefore, according to Black & 
Scholes (1973), equity in a company can be considered like a call option. This also conforms 
to the risk-reward trade-off theory.  
 
To finance a firm’s activities by debt, usually, there are also two options called private debt 
and public debt. Firms can raise capital by borrowing from banks, financial institutions or 
issuing bond. In return, debt holders will receive a fixed rate of interest, thus, debt holders 
are independent of firm performance. Despite not having ownership rights of voting or 
managing, debt holders will have claim to assets over equity holders in the event of 
insolvency. Lender’s benefits are also secured by collateral or other biding conditions. In 
addition, because interest expenses are often tax deductible, company’s decisions to take 
leverage or not are worth considering.  
 
Hybrid instrument is the last element of capital structure. There are three common types of 
hybrid securities including convertibles, preference shares and capital notes (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2011). These instruments combine features of both equity securities and debt 
securities. Likewise debt securities, hybrid securities typically commit to return a fixed or 
floating interest rate until a certain day. Besides that, they also have equity features such as 
the right to be converted into equity or early terminated at the time not favorable to the 
holders, and the holders being ancillary to other creditors in case of liquidation.  
 
 
2.2. Capital structure theories  
 
2.2.1. Modigliani & Miller theory (M&M) 
 
In the development of modern theories in finance, university professors and also Nobel Prize 
winners, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller can be considered as the ones who lay the 
foundation and build framework for most of today core theories in the field of capital 
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structure by publishing a theory called capital structure irrelevance theory (M&M theory) in 
the journal The American Economic Review in 1958 (Faruk & Burim, 2015).  
 
According to Pan (2012), the M&M theory very soon becomes the key theory of capital 
structure after its publication. The original proposition of M&M theory (1958) states that 
there is a perfectly efficient market in which there are no transaction costs, no bankruptcy 
costs and no taxation, the theory also suggests that there is plenty information at the disposal 
of all market participants. However, in 1963, in order to make the theory more realistic, 
Modigliani and Miller included also the influence of taxes in their model.  
 
According to Breuer and Gürtler (2008), there are two important propositions of Modigliani 
and Miller’s publications in 1958 and 1963, which build the basics of their theorem, can be 
extracted as below, respectively:  
 
 Proposition I claims that a firm’s capital structure does not have any impact on its 
total value in a perfect capital market.  
 Proposition II claims that the cost of equity increases with its debt-equity ratio. 
 
Proposition I: Irrelevance of the Capital Structure 
This proposition states that in perfect conditions of capital market, firm’s value is irrelevant 
to the capital structure of the firm. Whether a company has a low level of debt or is highly 
levered, it does not matter to the market value of the company. Rather, firm’s market value 
depends on its operating profits. The assumptions of a fully efficient market in M&M theory 
include the following conditions:  
 
 Transaction cost is nonexistent. 
 No bankruptcy cost. 
 There is a symmetry of information. All market participants have adequate 
knowledge and are free to access information. 
 Both the firm and investors are equal when they want to borrow against securities.  
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 All firms have the same risk class 
 
Besides the above mentioned conditions, taxation is a factor that plays an important role in 
M&M theory. Therefore, proposition I is analyzed in two situations: 
 
 Proposition I without the effect of taxes 
 
 Without taxes, the M&M theory can be expressed as the following formula (Pan, 2012): 
 
VL = VU 
Where, 
VL: the value of a levered firm in the capital structure 
VU: the value of an unlevered firm in the capital structure 
 
According to Brigham & Ehrhardt (2010), through this equation, Modigliani and Miller 
implies that there is no difference in value between two companies with different capital 
structure, one company uses leverage while the other does not. The way companies finance 
their assets and activities does not affect its market value, by assuming that the two 
companies generate the same cash flow. Moreover, the main factors determine the value of 
the company are operating profits and risk, not capital structure.  
 
 Proposition I with the effect of taxes 
 
With the effect of taxes, the M&M theory can be expressed as the formula below (Pan, 2012): 
 
VL = VU + TC D 
Where,  
VL: the value of a levered firm in the capital structure 
VU: the value of an unlevered firm in the capital structure 
TC D: the tax ratio (TC) x value of the debt (D) 
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According to Alifani and Nugroho (2013), companies that take more debt in their capital 
structure have a higher market value than unlevered companies because of the exclusion of 
interest expense from tax payment, which is called the tax shield effect. In other words, due 
to tax policies, firms that have leverage will pay less tax than firm with no debt, therefore, 
levered firms are more profitable or more valuable than unlevered firms. Of course, this 
conclusion must rely on the assumption of no bankruptcy cost of debt.   
 
However, despite the great contributions to modern capital structure theories, proposition I 
of M&M theories still meet criticism from other researchers due to its simplicity. According 
to Breuer & Gürtler (2008), proposition I does not take into account any hypotheses relating 
to the inefficiency of capital market. Also, the assumption of “same risk class” used to prove 
the proposition is criticized. Under the turbulences of today market, the perfect capital market 
assumption of M&M proposition I makes it seem unrealistic.  
 
Proposition II: Rate of return on equity 
M&M proposition II states that the cost of equity increases with the increment of debt-equity 
ratio in the capital structure of a firm. This statement relates to the definition of a broad 
concept used in finance called weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which is denoted 
as below:  
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐾𝑒  ∗ 
𝐸
𝑉
 + 𝐾𝑑 ∗ 
𝐷
𝑉
 
 
Where,  
E: Market value of the company's equity 
D: Market value of the company's debt 
V: Total Market Value of the company (E + D) 
𝐾𝑒: Company’s cost of equity/Investor’s expected return of equity 
𝐾𝑑 : Company’s cost of debt/Creditor’s return of debt 
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According to Villamil (2000), firm’s leverage does not affect firm’s weighted average cost 
of capital, therefore M&M proposition II indicates that when there is an increase in the firm’s 
debt to equity ratio (D/E), the firm’s cost of equity (𝐾𝑒) also experiences a linear increase.  
 
 Proposition II without the effect of taxes 
 
M&M proposition II explains that because investors are rational, the expected return of 
equity (𝐾𝑒) proportionally corresponds to the increment of leverage or debt to equity ratio 
(gearing D/E). According to Alifani & Nugroho (2013), 𝐾𝑒 is compensated by the benefit of 
cheaper debt finance, and hence, WACC remains unchanged.  
 
 
 
(Source: Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank, 2012) 
 
Figure 1. The cost of capital and value of the firm according to M&M theory (without taxes). 
 
As can be seen from the above figure, Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank (2012) shows that 
capital structure does not influence the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
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consequently, value of company remains unchanged. When taxes are not taken into account, 
any combination of equity and debt does not matter to the company’s value and shareholder’s 
equity.  
 
 Proposition II with the effect of taxes 
 
Modigliani and Miller incorporate the effect of taxes to their theories in 1963. They argue 
that the interest payment multiplied by the corporate tax rate is equal to the present value of 
savings from taxes. Hence, according to Brigham & Ehrhardt (2010), firms can reduce the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) by increasing the proportion of debt in their capital 
structure, because thanks to the effect of tax shield, those firms pay less tax.  
 
 
(Source: Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank, 2012) 
 
Figure 2. The cost of capital and value of the firm according to M&M theorem (with taxes). 
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Figure 2 shows that when taxes are taken into account, companies can take advantage of the 
tax shield phenomenon. When the gearing (D/E) ratio increases or, in other words, when the 
percentage of debt in capital structure increases, the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) declines while value of the company goes up. It can be concluded that tax shield 
does have impact on firm’s value through the adjustment of WACC. 
 
It can be said that with the effect of taxes, M&M proposition I does not hold true anymore. 
In addition, various countries and markets have different tax policies, therefore, market 
conditions among countries are not the same. If a country changes the law of taxes, 
proposition I is not valid anymore (Breuer & Gürtler, 2008). 
 
2.2.2. The trade-off theory 
 
The trade-off theory is an evolution of M&M theory but taking the effect of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs into consideration. The trade-off theory can be considered as a base where 
other groups of theories are basically relating to it, in which decisions of an optimal capital 
structure are achieved by balancing between the benefits of leverage and other kinds of costs 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
 
According to Myers (1984), companies can attain an optimal, value-maximizing debt to 
equity ratio by trading off the merits and demerits of debt when the inefficiency of the market 
is taken into account. Therefore, companies will set an ideal debt ratio in their capital 
structure and gradually will make efforts to achieve it.  
 
Despite the appealing advantages of tax shield when using debt, increasing debt ratio, at the 
other side, increases the costs of financial distress or what is usually called bankruptcy costs, 
because debt holders will require higher interest rates when there is an increment in debt to 
equity ratios, moreover, equity holders also require higher rate of equity return for taking the 
risk of insolvency in their investments. According to Brealey and Myers (2003), financial 
managers, when giving decisions of building a target capital structure, usually try to balance 
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the trade-off between the benefit of tax shield and the bankruptcy costs. They find out that 
unprofitable firms with risky, intangible assets should finance their activities mainly based 
on equity financing. By contrast, firms with safe, tangible assets and high enough taxable 
income to get advantages of tax shield effect should set a high target debt to equity ratio. The 
formula to calculate firm’s value based on the trade-off theory is as bellow: 
 
V = D + E = VF + PV – PV 
 
Where,  
D: Market value of the company's debt 
E: Market value of the company's equity 
VF: value of firms with all-equity financing 
PV: interest tax shield (the present value of future taxes saved due to the deduction of tax for 
interest rates) 
PV: costs of financial distress (the present value of future costs incurred because of the 
default risk with high leverage)  
 
Brealey & Myers (2003) also states that managers ought to decide the debt to equity ratio 
that maximize the value of their firms based on the trade-off theory. In other words, an 
optimal capital structure is achieved when interest tax shield is maximized and at the same 
time costs of financial distress associated with debt are minimized. This is always an 
extremely difficult decision to make for financial managers, therefore, the word “trade-off” 
is used to express a dilemma that when companies increase the level of debt so as to attain 
the maximum benefits of tax shield, they simultaneously increase the risk of a possible 
default. 
 
Throughout the research history about the trade-off in capital structure, researchers develop 
their theories in many aspects, and studies lead to the two main trade-off theories that are 
called static trade-off theory and dynamic trade-off theory. 
 
22 
 
Static trade-off theory 
 
According to the static trade-off theory, a company’s performance influences its target debt 
to equity ratio, which in turn is reflected in the company’s decision of issuing securities or 
increasing debt ratio (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Myers, 1984) 
 
Figure 3. Static trade-off theory. 
 
Bradley et al. (1984) provide the standard explanation of the static trade-off theory, in which 
the following conclusions on their model are made: 
 
 An increment in the bankruptcy costs reduces the optimal debt to equity ratio.  
 An increment in non-debt tax shield reduces the optimal debt to equity ratio.  
 An increment in the personal tax rate on equity increases the optimal debt to equity 
ratio. 
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 At the optimal capital structure, an increment in the marginal tax rate of bondholders 
decreases the optimal debt to equity ratio. 
 The impact of risk is vague, even if uncertainty is assumed to be normally distributed. 
The correlation between volatility and debt is negative. 
 
The theory also indicates that highly profitable firms commonly will have higher leverage 
level so that they can maximize the benefits of taxation and raise the availability of capital.  
According to Myers (1984), because the static trade – off theory is based on the assumption 
of perfect knowledge in an efficient market, the theory is both supported and criticized. 
Moreover, various researches have been also conducted to test whether corporations in real 
world follow the static trade – off theory (Sogorb and López, 2003; Hackbarth, Hennessy & 
Leland, 2007; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2010). 
 
According to Shyam, Sunder & Myers (1999), the static trade-off assumes that companies 
trade the marginal present values of interest tax shield off against the bankruptcy costs to 
achieve optimal capital structure. This ideal capital structure is only attained when the 
marginal value of future taxes saved due to the deduction of tax for interest rates exactly 
offset the increment in present value of the bankruptcy costs associated with borrowing more 
debt.  
 
The merit of debt is the tax shield rewarded for interest payments, which encourages the use 
of debt, however the positive effect can be less appealing with the presence of personal taxes 
(Miller, 1997) and non-debt tax shield (De Angelo & Masulis, 1980). The study of De Angelo 
& Masulis (1980) provide a theoretical optimal debt ratio where the present value of tax 
savings from further debt borrowing is just offset by increment in the present value of costs 
of financial distress. This theory is based on the assumption that there is no transaction costs 
for issuing or repurchasing securities (Dudley, 2007). The theory also states that because 
higher profitable companies would ensure higher tax saved due to the tax shield effect of 
debt financing, lower probability of financial distress and more promising investment 
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opportunities for future development of the companies, they set higher target debt to equity 
ratio (Niu, 2008).  
 
Dynamic trade-off theory 
 
Static trade-off theory argues that firms balance the risk of financial distress with the 
advantages of tax shield. However, according to the dynamic trade-off theory, issuing and 
repurchasing debt so as to attain an optimal capital structure to maximize firm’s value is 
costly. Therefore, according to Dudley (2007), companies with the debt level is not exactly 
equal their target will adjust their capital structure only when the benefits from adjustment 
are greater than the costs of adjustment.  
 
Also according to Dudley (2007), the dynamic trade-off theory states that companies let their 
debt to equity ratio vary within an optimal range. The empirical evidence in his study 
supports the implication of the dynamic trade-off theory, which concludes that volatility 
increases the optimal leverage range while interest rates and profitability decreases the 
leverage range.  He finds that profitable companies are more beneficial than unprofitable 
companies when readjusting their capital structure more often to attain the tax shield benefits.  
Hovakimian et al. (2001) also finds that more profitable companies are more likely to use 
debt financing over equity financing.  
 
2.2.3. The pecking order theory  
 
Based on the asymmetric information phenomenon between internal managers of a firm and 
external investors, Myers and Majluf (1984) develops the pecking order theory, which argues 
that, in order to reduce the costs of asymmetry of information, especially adverse selection, 
business managers adopt financial policies that prefer internal financing to external 
financing. The pecking order theory indicates that financial managers obey the following 
hierarchy among the three sources of fund: retained earnings, debt financing and equity 
financing as a last resort. This strategy avoids a decrease in share price when issuing new 
25 
 
shares, it also restricts future payment of dividend for new shares so as to increase cash flow. 
Furthermore, by reducing as much as possible firm’s exposures to debt, cost of capital can 
be lower. Therefore, profitable companies prefer self-financing by using retained earnings as 
the first choice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 4. Financial hierarchy among three sources of funds. 
 
Asymmetric information is the key driver explaining for the pecking order model. In 
management, managers are supposed to act to increase benefits for shareholders, they are 
fully aware of the company’s intrinsic value and have enough information about 
opportunities as well as risks of the company’s investment projects, whereas external 
investors are only able to receive information passively, thus they are vulnerable when 
information is manipulated. The asymmetry of information usually leads to adverse selection. 
Therefore, the pecking order theory states that companies should only issue equity as a last 
resort because equity issuance signals a lack of confidence that the company’s share price is 
overvalued. This behavior can cause stock price to fall. By contrast, debt issuance often 
signals a confidence that current stock price is undervalued and investment is profitable. That 
is the reason why debt is above equity in the order.  
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According to Myers (2001), the pecking order theory is different from the trade-off theory 
that there is no optimal capital structure in the pecking order theory. It indicates a passive 
relation between firm’s leverage and profitability that more profitable firms borrow less not 
because they set lower target debt to equity ratio but just because they have more available 
internal sources of fund. Unprofitable firms need more external sources of fund, hence they 
accumulate debt; it is not because they aim to attain an optimal financial structure.    
 
2.2.4. The agency theory  
 
Both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory suppose that there is no conflict of 
interest among internal management and external investors. However, according to Jensen & 
Meckling (1976), firm’s managers will not always behave in the best interest of stakeholders. 
They argue that there are two types of inevitable conflicts which cause the agency cost in 
companies: the first is a conflict between managers and shareholders and the second is a 
conflict between shareholders and creditors.  
 
Jensen (1986) develops the free cash flow hypothesis which states that free cash flow is an 
available cash flow after firm spends capital funding for all positive NPV (net present value) 
projects. When companies have a big amount of cash available, they tend to invest more to 
expand the company’s size, however, with the eager for rapid development, managers also 
have a tendency to put money in negative NPV or inefficient projects. Therefore, 
shareholders would like to receive dividend rather than agreeing with managers to waste their 
money. Debt creation might be a reasonable way to balance the problem. Using more debt 
will rise interest rate and increase principal payment of debt, therefore reduce available free 
cash flow. As a result, agency cost between managers and shareholders is minimized. Besides 
that, debt financing also creates an efficient pressure for managers to perform better in 
discipline to pay off the debt.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Stulz (1990), payment of debt may influences shareholders both 
positively and negatively. The negative side causes the conflict between shareholders and 
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debt holders. As analyzed above, debt, on the one hand, forces managers to work harder to 
pay interest, thus, reducing irrational investments that waste shareholder’s money. However, 
on the other hand, excessive debt leads to higher interest rate and spending capital paying for 
needless debt will restrict companies from profitable investment opportunities. Moreover, 
when companies face insolvency problem due to debt, shareholders will have no incentive to 
invest more even if there are positive NPV projects available because value generated from 
those projects will be distributed for debt holders first. Therefore, high level of debt may 
cause the rejection of value increasing investment projects.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Previous studies about the relationship between firm performance and capital structure can 
be categorized into two groups. The first group focuses on searching for determinants of 
capital structure, in which financial leverage is considered as the dependent variable, and 
firm performance is one of the independent variables. While the second group attempts to 
analyze factors affecting firm performance and financial leverage is considered as an 
independent variable. This study belongs to the second group with the purpose to find out the 
impact of financial leverage on firm profitability.  
 
Many empirical researches have been conducted to test the influence of capital structure 
(financial leverage) on firm performance in different markets, however, results are not 
consistent. Some of them conclude a positive impact, some find out a negative impact while 
others observe mixed impact or even no impact.  
 
 
3.1. Positive impact 
 
Dessi & Robertson (2003) explore the relationship among debt, incentives and performance 
of companies in UK. They conclude that financial leverage has a positive effect on 
performance. Furthermore, they find out firms that have less growth depend more on debt 
financing to take benefits of estimated growth opportunity. Moreover, when they spend the 
borrowed money for profitable investment projects, firm performance will be improved.  
 
Nimalathasan and Valeriu (2010) conduct their research in Srilanka, they observe that debt 
to equity ratio significantly positively affects all profitability ratios including operating profit, 
gross profit and net profit ratio.  
 
Schonbrodt (2011) reports the influence of firm’s specific variables over firm performance 
in US and Germany. Return on asset (ROA) is used as dependent variable to measure firm 
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profitability and independent variables representing for firm’s characteristics include 
financial leverage, size, tangibility, growth and liquidity. This study focuses on the 
comparison between capital structure of German companies and US companies. The authors 
find out that debt financing has more positive impact on performance of German companies 
than US companies.   
 
Umar et al. (2012) employ data on 100 listed companies in Pakistan over the period of 2006-
2009 and state that there is a significant positive correlation between firm performance and 
financial leverage. Firm profitability is measured by ROA, Earning per share (EPS) and net 
profit margins, and short-term debt scaled by total asset (STD/TA), long-term debt scaled by 
total asset (LTD/TA) and total debt divided by total asset (TD/TA) are used as proxies to 
measure capital structure variables. Researchers conclude that on the basic of exponential 
generalized least squares approach, their results are in line with the trade-off theory. 
 
Salteh et al. (2012) inspect the impact of capital structure on performance of 28 listed firms 
on Tehran stock exchange in the period of 2005-2009, they find that STD/TA, LTD/TA, 
TD/TA positively affect firm profitability proxies measured by Return on equity (ROE) and 
Tobin’s Q indicators.  
 
Nikoo (2015), by using data of 17 banks in Tehran stock exchange in the period from 2009 
to 2014 also sees that capital structure has significantly positive impact on performance of 
the analyzed banks.   
 
 
3.2. Negative impact 
 
Noting that a single metric is not sufficient to measure firm performance, Salim & Yadav 
(2012) use ROA, ROE, EPS and Tobin’s Q as indicators to measure firm profitability. The 
panel data of 237 listed companies in Malaysia in the period 1995-2011 is used to analyze 
and the authors observe that TD/TA, LTD/TA and STD/TA significantly negatively affect 
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ROA, ROE, EPS and Tobin’s Q. Manawaduge et al. (2011) analyze 155 firms in the 
emerging market of Srilanka over the period 2002-2008 and find out an inverse impact of 
financial leverage on firm performance. In another research, Chakraborty (2010) also 
observes an adverse relationship between financial leverage and firm performance in India 
market where performance is denoted as the relative amount of earnings before interest and 
taxes.  
 
Memon et al. (2012) apply a log-linear regression model by employing data of 141 companies 
in Pakistan in the period of 2004-2009 to test the influence of financial leverage on ROA of 
those firms and document a negative relationship between TD/TA and ROA. Muritala (2012) 
applies the panel least square approach to conduct empirical analysis about the link between 
debt to equity ratio and firm performance of 10 Nigerian companies over the period 2006-
2010 and also reports that TD/TA has a negative influence on ROA. Another study of 
Soumadi & Hayajneh (2015) claim a similar negative impact of TD/TA on ROE and Tobin’s 
Q when analyzing data of 76 companies in Jordan over the period from 2001 to 2006.  
 
Gansuwan and Önel (2012) investigate the influence of financial leverage of 174 listed 
companies in Sweden on their performance in the period from 2002 to 2011. The authors 
employ ordinary least squares regression to conduct this research. They use three proxies to 
measure performance: ROA, ROE and Return on investment (ROI) as dependent variables 
and TD/TA, LTD/TA and STD/TA as independent variables. The empirical results suggest 
that firm’s financial leverage significantly negatively affects performance of Swedish 
companies.  
 
Tan (2012) explores the link between financial distress and firm performance of 277 firms in 
eight East Asian economics during the financial crisis in the period 1997-1998. The empirical 
findings show that high-leverage firms are supposed to perform worse than low-leverage 
companies. In other words, a higher level of debt leads to a higher probability of financial 
distress and weak performance. In addition, the 1997-1998 crisis also strengthens the 
negative relation between financial leverage and firm performance.  
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Doğan (2013) conducts empirical analysis on listed insurance companies in Borsa Istanbul 
in the period of 2005-2011 to capture the relationship between firm’s capital structure and its 
performance. Results show that financial leverage has a negative effect on ROA ratio, 
moreover, firm’s size positively affects firm profitability while firm’s age has a negative 
impact.  
 
Iavorskyi (2013) tests the impact of firm’s leverage on firm performance of 16,500 firms in 
Ukraina over the period 2001-2010. TD/TA is used as an independent variable to measure 
leverage and the metrics for firm performance are ROA, Return on sales (ROS), Total factor 
productivity (TFP). The findings of this study show that financial leverage has a negative 
impact on firm performance. The author claims that this result disagrees with the free cash 
flow and trade-off theories but supports the pecking order theory.  
 
By using multiple regression analysis, Abdel-Jalil (2014) observes a significant inverse 
impact of debt ratio on ROI of companies in Jordan. Ramadan and Ramadan (2015) also test 
the data of 72 firms in Jordan over the period of 2008-2012 by applying the pooled ordinary 
least squares and report a negative impact of the capital structure variables TD/TA, LTD/TA 
and STD/TA on ROA. 
 
 
3.3. Mixed impact  
 
Ebrati et al. (2013) conduct a research on capital structure and firm performance by using the 
sample of 85 Iranian firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period of 2006-2011 
and applying multiple regression analysis. The authors use four indicators to measure firm 
performance as dependent variables: ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and the Market value of equity 
to book value of equity ratio (M/B). They also use four metrics for independent variables to 
measure leverage: LTD/TA, STD/TA, TD/TA and total debt to total equity. The empirical 
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findings are mixed that financial leverage has a positive impact with ROE, M/B and Tobin’s 
Q, but has a negative impact with ROA 
 
Tianyu (2013) uses a sample of more than 1200 listed firms in Germany and more than 1000 
listed firms in China in period 2003-2012 to test the influence of capital structure on firm 
profitability in these two markets. The author uses Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and total 
debt as an indicator for leverage. The study reports that financial leverage has a significantly 
negative effect on firm performance in China, whereas it has a significantly positive impact 
on performance of Germany firms before the 2008 crisis.  
 
 
3.4. No relationship 
 
While many studies document either a positive or negative relationship between financial 
leverage and firm performance, there are also some researches show that there is no such 
significant correlation between them.  
 
Ebaid (2009) employs data of 64 companies listed in Egypt’s capital market in the period of 
1997-2005 to test the influence of debt to equity ratio on profitability of the companies, 
however, after conducting multiple regression analysis, the authors find from a weak to no 
impact.  
 
Al-Taani (2013) also reports that there is no statistically significant correlation between debt 
ratios and ROA when analyzing Jordanian firms over the period of 2005-2009. 
 
 
3.5. Findings in the context of Vietnam 
 
Fu-Min Chang et al. (2014) investigate the relationship between capital structure and firm 
performance of Vietnamese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the period of 2007-2011. 
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Their empirical findings document that short-term debts have a significantly negative relation 
with accounting-based firm performance while long-term debts are positively correlated with 
market-based firm performance. Furthermore, according to their study, because of the 
socialist market economy reforms, SOEs are less dominant in firm performance. They also 
report that the 2008 financial crisis changes the link between capital structure and firm 
performance of SOEs in Vietnam. Hence, they anticipate Vietnamese firms can gain new 
insight in the future.   
 
Nguyen & Nguyen (2015) examine the influence of capital structure on 147 listed firms in 
Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) in the period from 2006 to 2014. The authors not 
only test the effect of financial leverage on firm performance in general but also use short-
term debt and long-term debt ratio to test the effect of debt maturity. The study finds that the 
relationship between leverage and firm performance is significantly negative, however, there 
is no difference between the impact of short-term debts and long-term debts.  
 
Le & Phan (2017) conduct a study about the impact of capital structure on performance of 
non-financial listed firms in Vietnam over the period of 2007-2012. They observe that all 
debt ratios significantly negatively affect firm performance. They also argue that this result 
is consistent with most researches in this field in the context of developing markets, while it 
is not in line with some researches inspected in developed countries, which indicate a positive 
link between financial leverage and firm profitability. Moreover, they point out that the 
controlling role of debt is not substantial due to severe asymmetric information phenomenon 
and inefficient financial system in Vietnam. 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
Before the socialist-oriented market economic reforms in 1986, Vietnam adhered the central 
planned model of socialism which is mainly based on SOEs, agriculture and heavy industry. 
In the meantime, the Vietnamese economy severely suffered from hyperinflation and 
financial crisis. For this reason, in 1986 the Vietnamese government decided to implement a 
reform called “Doi Moi”, to convert the central planned economy to a market economy with 
the purpose of attaining a developed and stable economy (Fu-Min Chang et al., 2014). In this 
institutional context of a typical developing country, this chapter will discuss about the 
Vietnamese economy and the Vietnamese financial environment - in which Vietnamese 
corporations are operating.  
 
 
4.1. Vietnamese economy 
 
4.1.1. Vietnamese economy in general 
 
After the 1986 reform, Vietnam witnessed a significant improvement both in politics and 
economics, confirming the attempts to modernize the country. It can be said that one of the 
remarkable milestones for the Vietnamese economy is the successful participation in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, which makes the economic environment in 
Vietnam more attractive and competitive. According to World Bank (2017), the country has 
been recognized for its attainments in controlling inflation, strengthening external accounts 
and macroeconomic stability. These achievements have changed Vietnam from one of the 
world’s poorest countries to a lower middle-income country.  
 
Since 1990, Vietnam has been ranked as one of the economies with the highest GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) per capita growth in the world, the average growth rate is about 6.4 
percent a year in the 2000s (World Bank, 2017). As can be seen from figure 5, in recent years, 
annual GDP growth of Vietnam has overcome other countries in the same lower-middle 
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income class and the numbers are far above the world average. In spite of the instability of 
global environment, Vietnamese economy is still durable. With GDP increasing by more than 
6% in 2016 the country’s mid-term prospect looks promising with strong domestic demand 
and export oriented manufacturing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: www.data.worldbank.org) 
 
Figure 5. GPD growth (annual %) of Vietnam, other lower middle-income countries and the             
World Average in the period 2006-2016. 
 
Another important indicator to prove the impressive growth of Vietnamese economy is FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment). According to Oxford Business Group (2017), Vietnam’s 
accession to WTO in 2007 has promoted FDI growth, with average annual inflows increase 
from $2.5 billion in the period 2000-2005 to $8.4 billion in the period 2008-2014. Until 
November 2016, the total FDI stock was $293 billion with the contribution of investors from 
114 countries running 22,280 projects in Vietnam.  
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4.1.2. Vietnamese corporate context 
 
As a part of the “Doi Moi” reform, since 1992 the Vietnamese government has applied 
equitization and privatization policies to transform many SOEs to joint-stock or private 
companies. The purpose of these polices is to mobilize capital from investors both inside and 
outside Vietnam, to increase financial capacity and remodel management methods and 
modernize technology to enhance competitiveness and effectiveness of the Vietnamese 
economy. 
 
According to KPMG (2017), the number of SOEs in Vietnam declined significantly over the 
period of 2011-2015. In these five years, nearly 600 SOEs were equitized and 96% of the 
target was reached. The Vietnamese government plans to  hold 100% stake of only 103 SOEs 
in the period 2016-2020, whereas continue equitizing 137 companies more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: KPMG, 2017) 
 
Figure 6. Number of SOEs & SOE IPOs in Vietnam in the period 2011-2015. 
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4.2. Vietnamese financial environment  
 
According to the country report of IMF (2017), due to bouts of uncertainty, Vietnam’s 
accelerated financial growth since the early 2000s has been terminated. The financial system 
is still controlled by the state and remains bank-centered, credit has grown fast, however, the 
output efficiency of credit has decreased, rate of return to investment has fallen. Figure 7 
shows that the credit intensity of growth has risen in recent years. IMF reports that actual 
credit growing is nearly three time faster than real GDP. Inappropriate credit growing targets 
by bank and by sector of activity are still in effect, which cause the inefficiency in capital 
allocation across business areas and enterprises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Vietnamese authorities and IMF staff estimates) 
 
Figure 7. Vietnam: Credit Intensity of Growth.  
 
IMF (2017) suggests that large ranging bank reforms are necessary to build a level playing 
field for access to credit, increase the efficiency and level of investment as well as financial 
sector resilience. Moreover, more professional financial markets and institutions are also 
seriously needed to finance investment and infrastructure.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1. Data Selection  
 
The dataset used for empirical analysis in this paper is obtained from Bureau Van Dijk’s 
ORBIS database and official annual reports of listed firms in Vietnam. Financial information 
of publicly listed firms in two stock exchanges in Vietnam, including Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), is collected in the 9-year period from 
2008 to 2016, which builds a panel data. These firms will be categorized into two different 
sectors, non-financial firms and banks. Unlevered firms and firms with insufficient financial 
data will be eliminated from the sample. Moreover, data for macroeconomic variables is 
obtained from the World Bank’s Database. Because the analyzed period comprises the period 
of the global financial crisis in 2008, data for this stage will be studied appropriately by using 
dummy variables.  
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
According to Fama & French (1992), the meaning of capital structure in financial and non-
financial firms is different. While high leverage of non-financial firms more likely indicates 
financial distress, this leverage level is probably normal for financial firms.  Flannery (1994) 
also reports that banks are affected by debt level as the same way as other firms, however, 
they operate unusually high leverage. Therefore this paper tests the impact of capital structure 
on performance of non-financial firms separately by eliminating data of financial firms (those 
with a one-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code of six). Nevertheless, because 
of the special role of banks in the traditional bank-centered financial system in Vietnam, this 
paper will also use independent models to investigate the effect of financial leverage on 
performance of listed banks in Vietnam.  
 
Moreover, data used in this paper includes the period of one of the worst global financial 
crises in 2008, which has a large contagion all over the World and Vietnam is no exception. 
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According to Nguyen et al. (2011), the financial crisis unfolded in 2008 causes the World 
economy into Great Recession, the contagious effects of the crisis spread over all continents. 
Most countries suffered from financial distress and high unemployment rate. Until 2010, 
Greece and Ireland are considered as the latest victims of the 2008 crisis. In this global 
context, Vietnamese economy experienced sharp downturn due to the spillover effect of the 
crisis. Industrial production in the fourth quarter of 2008 declined to 15.6% in comparison 
with 17.4% in 2007. This period also witnessed a dramatic decrease in Vietnamese GDP. For 
this reason, this paper also explores the influence of capital structure on performance of 
Vietnamese listed firms during the downturn period from 2008 to 2010.  
 
5.2.1. Capital structure and performance of non-financial firms  
 
 Measure of firm performance 
According to Short et al. (2007), ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are often used as indicators 
measuring firm performance. While ROA and ROE are employed to present firm’s 
accounting performance, Tobin’s Q captures firm’s market performance. ROA is determined 
as the ratio of earnings after interest and tax divided by total assets, ROE is determined as 
the ratio of earnings after interest and tax divided by total equity and Tobin’s Q is calculated 
by dividing total market value of firm (market capitalization + market value of debt) into 
total asset value of firm (King & Santor, 2008). 
 
 Measure of capital structure 
Capital structure is captured by using firm’s financial leverage. Based on the study of King 
& Santor (2008), leverage ratio (LEV) is calculated by dividing total debt into total equity. 
 
 Measure of control variables  
According to Saurabh & Anil (2015), high sales growth has a direct effect on profitability of 
a firm because growth firms can generate more value from investment opportunities. More 
tangible firms are able to avail more debts due to their collateral value, therefore, tangibility 
has an impact on firm performance. Size and age are also important factors affecting firm 
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performance because large size and older firms can take advantage of greater credibility and 
economies of scale, better capabilities and diversification benefits, which may influence 
profitability.  
 
Based on the study of Le & Phan (2017), high profitable firms are more efficient and thus 
expected to have higher performance. Moreover, firms with high level of cash are able to 
alleviate financial distress problems, more capable of supporting their new projects and 
paying dividends. Hence, liquidity is assumed to positively correlate with firm performance.  
 
Table 1 provides details of control variables and their measures.  
 
Table 1. Control variables of non-financial firms.  
 
 
 Empirical models 
By using the measures of variables above, regression equations for firm performance are 
formulated as below: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (1) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (2) 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
Variables Measures 
Growth (GRO) The percentage change in sales over year 
Tangibility (TAN) The ratio between fixed assets and total assets 
Size (SIZ) Natural logarithm of total assets 
Age (AGE) The number of years since incorporation date  
Profitability (PRO) The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total sales 
Liquidity (LIQ) The ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets 
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Where 𝛽0 is the intercept of the equations; 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽7 are coefficients of independent 
variables; 𝑖, 𝑡 specify firm i at time t and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
 
5.2.2. Capital structure and performance of banks  
 
To investigate the impact of capital structure on performance of listed banks in Vietnam, the 
leverage ratio (LEV) is still used to measure capital structure. However, because most of the 
banks in Vietnam launch the initial public offering (IPO) after 2008, data of market 
capitalization to calculate Tobin’s Q during the whole period 2008-2016 is lacked. Therefore, 
only ROA and ROE are used to measure performance of listed banks. Moreover, due to the 
difference in nature of operation, asset structure and capital structure of banks and non-
financial firms; as well as the special role of banks in Vietnamese economy and the mutual 
impact between banks and macroeconomics, control variables are re-determined.   
 
Based on the study of Siddik et al. (2017), control variables for banks can be categorized into 
two types: bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. This paper also uses 
growth, size and liquidity as bank-specific control variables, while GDP and inflation factors 
are considered as macroeconomic variables. The importance of growth, size and liquidity to 
bank performance is similar to non-financial firms.  
 
Regarding economic factors, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) indicate that during economic 
downturns, demand for loans may decrease, and thus lower bank profitability. By contrast, 
during economic booms, when most industries are in good prospects and there are plenty of 
promising investment projects, demand for loans may increase, which leads to an increase in 
interest rate and improve bank performance. Therefore, GDP is used as a proxy to measure 
the impact of economics on bank performance. Inflation also plays a vital role in banking 
industry. By taking estimated inflation into consideration, banks will adjust their nominal 
interest rate so that their revenue can override the cost to keep high profits (Siddik et al., 
2017).  
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Measures of bank control variables are described in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Control variables of banks. 
 
 
The models to capture the impact of capital structure on bank performance are denoted as 
below:  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                  (4) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                (5) 
 
5.2.3. Capital structure and firm performance during financial crisis 
 
To investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the relationship between capital structure 
and firm performance, a dummy variable - 𝐶𝑅𝐼 is added to the models (1)-(5) above. 𝐶𝑅𝐼 
takes the value of 1 for crisis period from 2008 to 2010 and 0 for the post-crisis period from 
2011 to 2016. New regression models are denoted as the following: 
 
 For non-financial firms 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (6) 
 
Variables Measures 
Bank-specific 
 
Growth (GRO) 
The percentage change in sales over 
year 
Size (SIZ) Natural logarithm of total assets 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
The ratio of cash and cash equivalent 
to total assets 
Macroeconomic 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Natural logarithm of GDP 
Inflation (INF) The annual inflation rate 
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𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (7) 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (8) 
 
 For banks 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                (9) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                   (10) 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of all variables as measures of capital structure, control variables and 
performance of non-financial firms are described in table 3. As can be seen from the table, 
the leverage ratio (LEV) of non-financial firms in Vietnam is relatively high, the mean and 
median values are 1.43 and 1.13 respectively, which are higher than 1, mean that debt 
financing predominates equity financing. The number also indicates that in comparison with 
other countries, Vietnamese firms are overleveraged. Specifically, the leverage ratio is just 
about 0.28 for companies in France throughout the period 1998-2009 (De La Bruslerie & 
Latrous, 2012) and 0.5 for companies from 22 Western European and East Asian countries 
during the period 1996-2008 (Lin et al., 2011).   
 
Firm performance proxies are described by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. The average return 
on assets (ROA) of non-financial firms in Vietnam is 6.27%, while the corresponding number 
for return on equity (ROE) is 12.04%. The mean value of Tobin’s Q is 1.05. Table 3 also 
reveals that value of Tobin’s Q ranges from 0.19 to 6.44. Values of the other two indicators 
of firm performance ROA and ROE also have a large spread. ROA varies from -64.55% to 
45.28% while ROE varies from -186.7% to 95.09%. This suggests that there is a significant 
divergence in performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam during the period from 
2008 to 2016.    
 
In terms of control variables, the mean value of growth (GRO) is 0.13 (13%), ranges from -
0.88 (88%) to 11.34 (1134%), this implies a very big gap in growth of non-financial firms in 
Vietnam, some companies have significantly high growth rate. The average value of 
tangibility (TAN) and size (SIZ) are 0.42 and 10.97 respectively. Firm age (AGE) varies 
from 4 years to 108 years with mean age is 27. Profitability (PRO) and liquidity (LIQ) have 
mean values of 9.6% and 10.5% respectively. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics – Non-financial firms. 
 
The table provides descriptive statistics of all variables. Financial leverage (LEV) is the ratio between total debt and total equity. Growth (GRO) is measured 
as the percentage change in sales over year. Tangibility (TAN) is the ratio between fixed assets and total assets. Firm size (SIZ) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since incorporation date. Profitability (PRO) is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total sales. The ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets is used to measure liquidity (LIQ). Firm performance is measured by return on asset 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings after interest and tax divided by total assets. ROE is calculated as 
the ratio of earnings after interest and tax divided by total equity. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of total market value of firm divided by total assets. 
 
 ROA (%) ROE (%) TOBIN’S Q LEV GRO TAN SIZ AGE PRO LIQ 
 Mean  6.266  12.037  1.048  1.430  0.132  0.419  10.972  27.172  0.096  0.105 
 Median  4.848  11.279  0.929  1.133  0.078  0.388  10.894  25  0.073  0.072 
 Maximum  45.278  95.094  6.443  6.850  11.341  0.975  14.683  108  0.758  0.532 
 Minimum -64.551 -186.697  0.190  0.006 -0.875  0.025  8.139  4 -6.091  0.000 
 Std. Dev.  7.321  13.933  0.518  1.249  0.574  0.211  1.221  15.394  0.269  0.101 
 Skewness -0.136 -3.683  4.604  1.725  11.094  0.519  0.460  1.677 -16.618  1.620 
 Kurtosis  17.334  61.637  37.200  6.644  203.996  2.524  3.030  8.922  385.966  5.638 
           
 Jarque-Bera  6243.382  106085.6  38104.18  764.929  1242083.  39.633  25.772  1407.146  4488437.  530.046 
 Probability  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
           
 Sum  4567.860  8775.009  763.896  1042.531  96.453  305.232  7998.318  19809.00  70.100  76.858 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  39021.54  141326.4  195.336  1136.010  239.785  32.382  1086.215  172526.2  52.670  7.403 
           
 Observations  729  729  729  729  729  729  729  729  729  729 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics – Banks. 
 
The table provides descriptive statistics of all variables. Financial leverage (LEV) is the ratio between total debt and total equity. Bank-specific variables 
include growth, size and liquidity. Growth (GRO) is measured as the percentage change in sales over year. Bank size (SIZ) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets is used to measure liquidity (LIQ). Macroeconomic variables include gross 
domestic product and inflation rate. Gross domestic product (GDP) is measured as the natural logarithm of annual GDP and inflation (INF) is measured as 
the annual inflation rate. Bank performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings 
after interest and tax divided by total assets. ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings after interest and tax divided by total equity. 
 
 ROA (%) ROE (%) LEV GRO SIZ LIQ GDP INF 
 Mean  0.843  10.479  11.607  0.326  18.638  0.021  21.827  0.090 
 Median  0.830  10.442  11.187  0.134  18.805  0.012  21.899  0.071 
 Maximum  2.099  28.464  22.498  2.270  20.670  0.124  22.265  0.231 
 Minimum  0.010  0.068  2.756 -0.450  16.073  0.001  21.273  0.006 
 Std. Dev.  0.470  6.441  3.586  0.521  1.008  0.025  0.338  0.070 
 Skewness  0.028  0.449  0.323  1.281 -0.384  2.242 -0.335  0.911 
 Kurtosis  2.444  2.888  3.413  4.381  2.898  7.328  1.711  2.636 
         
 Jarque-Bera  1.171  3.065  2.201  31.755  2.253  145.626  7.919  12.933 
 Probability  0.557  0.216  0.333  0.000  0.324  0.000  0.019  0.002 
         
 Sum  75.915  943.109  1044.595  29.295  1677.437  1.901  1964.474  8.078 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  19.681  3692.423  1144.626  24.179  90.345  0.057  10.198  0.437 
         
 Observations  90  90  90  90  90  90  90  90 
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Table 4 reports the summary statistics of financial leverage, bank-specific control variables, 
macroeconomic control variables and performance of listed banks in Vietnam during the 
period 2008-2016. As expected, financial leverage (LEV) ratios of banks are much higher 
than those of non-financial firms with mean and median values of 11.61 and 11.19, 
respectively. Because of the special features of bank’s operation in comparison with other 
industries, the unusually high leverage ratio is understandable (Flannery, 1994). However, 
the spread in values of financial leverage of Vietnamese listed banks is still high, ranging 
from 2.76 to 22.5.  
 
Bank performance is described by ROA and ROE. Mean values of the two indicators are 
0.84% and 10.48% respectively. These numbers are relatively low compared to non-financial 
firms. However the spread between min and max values of ROA and ROE is also lower, 
bank ROA ranges from 0.01% to 2.1% while bank ROE ranges from 0.07% to 28.46%.  
 
Regarding bank-specific control variables, mean value of bank growth (GRO) is 32.6% but 
the median value is just 13.4%, whereas minimum value is -45% and maximum value jumps 
up to 227%. This suggests that the growth levels of listed banks in Vietnam are uneven.  
Average bank size (SIZ) is 18.64, which is also higher than non-financial firms. Yet, liquidity 
of Vietnamese banks is relatively low with a mean value of 2.1%, minimum value is close to 
0% means that some banks do not even have cash and cash equivalent in their asset structure. 
Regarding macroeconomic variables, the average value of natural logarithm of Vietnam’s 
GDP in this period is 21.83 and inflation rate is 9%. 
 
It should be noted that due to the small number of listed banks in Vietnam as well as the lack 
of financial data, the number of observations is only 90. As a result, some variables have high 
skewness (more than 1) and kurtosis is lower than 3, which might lead to a violation of 
normality assumption, which can cause bias or inefficient regression models. However, this 
paper still conducts regressions for the models indicating the relationship between capital 
structure and performance of listed banks in Vietnam and the empirical results can be 
considered just for reference.  
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6.2. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 5 represents the correlation coefficients between all variables used in the regression 
models of non-financial firms. Correlations among all independent variables are small. 
However, correlation between ROA and ROE is relatively high (0.86). This is explainable 
because both ROA and ROE ratios use earnings after interest and tax as the numerators and 
both aim for accounting profitability. Furthermore, ROA and ROE are used as dependent 
variables in two separate models, therefore high correlation will not affect regression results 
of each model.  
 
Likewise, correlation coefficients of all variables used in the regression models of banks are 
shown in table 6. Correlation between ROA and ROE has a similar pattern as non-financial 
firms with the coefficient is 0.83. Correlations among independent variables are small except 
the pair of growth (GRO) and inflation (INF) with the coefficient is 0.72.  
 
In the next part, multicollinearity test will be run to check if the correlation among variables 
is a serious concern affecting the results.  
 
6.3. Test of multicollinearity 
 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is conducted to investigate whether multicollinearity 
exists among independent variables. According to Siddik et al. (2017), VIF <10 is acceptable. 
Table 7 and table 8 show the multicollinearity test using VIF for independent variables in 
different regression models of non-financial firms and banks respectively.  
 
The values of VIF for all variables in table 7 are very small, just above 1, therefore there is a 
very low level of multicollinearity in three models which use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as 
dependent variables. According to table 8, the highest VIF for bank variables is 3.09 for 
inflation variable (INF), which is still far lower than 10. Hence, multicollinearity is not 
considered to be a serious issue in this study.   
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Table 5. Correlation matrix – Nonfinancial firms. 
 
 ROA ROE TOBIN’S Q LEV GRO TAN SIZ AGE PRO LIQ 
ROA  1.000            
ROE  0.857  1.000         
TOBIN’S Q  0.570  0.437  1.000        
LEV -0.372 -0.114 -0.095  1.000       
GRO  0.094  0.116  0.050  0.057  1.000      
TAN -0.075 -0.116 -0.047 -0.078 -0.050  1.000     
SIZ  0.075  0.085  0.308  0.137  0.060  0.312  1.000    
AGE  0.187  0.106  0.121 -0.058 -0.064 -0.062 -0.146  1.000   
PRO  0.324  0.286  0.155 -0.129  0.088  0.191  0.106  0.044  1.000  
LIQ  0.362  0.273  0.147 -0.171 -0.012 -0.283  0.019  0.131  0.076  1.000 
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix – Banks. 
 
 ROA ROE LEV GRO SIZ LIQ GDP INF 
ROA  1.000        
ROE  0.832  1.000       
LEV -0.097  0.402  1.000      
GRO  0.365  0.250 -0.080  1.000     
SIZ  0.154  0.351  0.430 -0.348  1.000    
LIQ  0.488  0.225 -0.284  0.202 -0.088  1.000   
GDP -0.543 -0.451  0.107 -0.552  0.454 -0.398  1.000  
INF  0.433  0.326 -0.180  0.718 -0.352  0.309 -0.716  1.000 
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Table 7. Multicollinearity test using variance inflation factor (VIF) – Non-financial firms.  
 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Variable Coefficient Centered Coefficient Centered Coefficient Centered 
 Variance VIF Variance VIF Variance VIF 
C 4.519 NA 20.395 NA 0.028 NA 
LEV 0.035 1.106 0.156 1.106 0.000 1.106 
GRO 0.152 1.026 0.687 1.026 0.001 1.026 
TAN 1.451 1.322 6.549 1.322 0.009 1.322 
SIZ 0.039 1.204 0.178 1.204 0.000 1.204 
AGE 0.000 1.047 0.001 1.047 1.340 1.047 
PRO 0.732 1.085 3.306 1.085 0.005 1.085 
LIQ 5.743 1.196 25.918 1.196 0.036 1.196 
 
Table 8. Multicollinearity test using variance inflation factor (VIF) – Banks. 
 
 ROA ROE 
Variable Coefficient Centered Coefficient Centered 
 Variance VIF Variance VIF 
C 10.393 NA 1808.453 NA 
LEV 0.000 1.470 0.020 1.470 
GRO 0.008 2.158 1.415 2.158 
SIZ 0.002 1.713 0.301 1.713 
LIQ 2.179 1.373 379.203 1.373 
GDP 0.024 2.685 4.174 2.685 
INF 0.645 3.094 112.294 3.094 
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6.4. The impact of capital structure on firm performance 
 
Table 9. The impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms, 
which are estimated by panel OLS regressions. Statistics are based on annual data during the period 2008-2016. 
Model 1 reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on firm performance measured by return on assets 
(ROA). Model 2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and firm performance measured 
by return on equity (ROE). Model 3 reports the link between financial leverage (LEV) and firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. There are six control variables: firm growth (GRO), tangibility (TAN), firm size (SIZ), 
firm age (AGE), profitability (PRO) and liquidity (LIQ). Regressions are estimated using the models: 
ROAi,t =  β0 + β1LEVi,t + β2GROi,t + β3TANi,t + β4SIZi,t + β5AGEi,t + β6PROi,t + β7LIQi,t + εi,t               (1) 
ROEi,t =  β0 + β1LEVi,t + β2GROi,t + β3TANi,t + β4SIZi,t + β5AGEi,t + β6PROi,t + β7LIQi,t + εi,t  (2) 
Tobin′Qi,t =  β0 + β1LEVi,t + β2GROi,t + β3TANi,t + β4SIZi,t + β5AGEi,t + β6PROi,t + β7LIQi,t + εi,t         (3) 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable 
ROE 
(2) 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C -2.996 0.159 -3.387 0.454 -0.685*** 0.000 
LEV -1.896*** 0.000 -0.841** 0.034 -0.055*** 0.000 
GRO 1.125*** 0.004 2.176*** 0.009 0.022 0.476 
TAN -3.945*** 0.001 -9.714*** 0.000 -0.447*** 0.000 
SIZ 0.832*** 0.000 1.315*** 0.002 0.166*** 0.000 
AGE 0.069*** 0.000 0.071** 0.023 0.005*** 0.000 
PRO 7.022*** 0.000 13.826*** 0.000 0.232*** 0.001 
LIQ 16.990*** 0.000 25.803*** 0.000 0.188 0.319 
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.337  0.174  0.177  
F-statistic 53.806 0.000 22.838 0.000 23.379 0.000 
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Table 10. The impact of capital structure on performance of banks. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of banks, which are 
estimated by panel OLS regressions. Statistics are based on annual data during the period 2008-2016. Model 1 
reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on bank performance measured by return on assets (ROA). Model 
2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and bank performance measured by return on 
equity (ROE). There are three bank-specific control variables: firm growth (GRO), firm size (SIZ), and liquidity 
(LIQ); two macroeconomic control variables include gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (INF).  
Regressions are estimated using the models: 
ROAi,t =  β0 + β1LEVi,t + β2GROi,t + β3SIZi,t + β4LIQi,t + β5GDPi,t + β6INFi,t + εi,t                                    (4) 
ROEi,t =  β0 + β1LEVi,t + β2GROi,t + β3SIZi,t + β4LIQi,t + β5GDPi,t + β6INFi,t + εi,t                                    (5) 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable  
ROE 
(2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C 15.717*** 0.000 204.190*** 0.000 
LEV -0.031*** 0.006 0.453*** 0.002 
GRO 0.194** 0.034 0.905 0.449 
SIZ 0.289*** 0.000 3.722*** 0.000 
LIQ 3.590** 0.017 15.826 0.419 
GDP -0.916*** 0.000 -12.338*** 0.000 
INF -0.520 0.519 3.731 0.726 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.588  0.618  
F-statistic 22.168 0.000 24.983 0.000 
     
This part employs the panel ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the impact of 
financial leverage on performance of listed firms in Vietnam. Table 9 and table 10 
demonstrate the empirical results for non-financial firms and banks respectively.  
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As can be seen from table 9, model 1 presents the relationship between financial leverage 
and return on assets (ROA), which is used to measure firm performance. The empirical 
results show that financial leverage has a negative impact on firm performance. In other 
words, the negative coefficient of the variable LEV implies that the higher level of debt is, 
the lower ROA is. The value of the coefficient of LEV is -1.896, suggesting that when the 
ratio between total debt and total equity increases by 1, the ROA will fall about 1.9%, holding 
all other variables constant. The t-statistic of the variable LEV is very high (-10.19) and p-
value is 0.00, meaning that this impact is strong and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Model 2 shows a similar result for ROE, coefficient of the variable LEV is -0.841 which 
means that when financial leverage rises 1 unit, ROE will decrease about 0.84%, all else 
unchanged. However, this relationship is weaker compared to ROA because the result is just 
significant at the 5% level. The outcome in model 3 reveals a small impact of capital structure 
on Tobin’s Q, although the link between financial leverage and Tobin’s Q is significant at 
the 1% level, the coefficient of the variable LEV is relatively low (-0.055), indicating that 
when financial leverage increases 1 unit, Tobin’s Q will decline about 0.055%, all other 
things being equal.  
 
Regarding control variables, table 9 presents that firm growth significantly positively affect 
ROA and ROE at the 1% level, however, the effect is not significant for Tobin’s Q. All three 
models point out a reverse relationship between tangibility and firm performance, which are 
significant at the 1% level. This result implies that a higher percent of fixed assets in asset 
structure of companies in Vietnam does not necessarily lead to higher profitability. As 
anticipated, firm size, firm age, profitability and liquidity factors all positively affect firm 
performance, all coefficients are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, except the relationship 
between liquidity and Tobin’s Q in model 3 is insignificant.    
 
Another significant point is that all F-statistic tests have p-values of 0.00, which are lower 
than 1%, indicating a good fitness of the regression models. Additionally, adjusted R-squared 
values are also acceptable, which range from 0.174 in model 2 to 0.177 in model 3 and the 
ROA regression in model 1 has the highest adjusted R-squared value of 0.337. Overall, it can 
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be inferred from the empirical models that financial leverage or the level of debt negatively 
affects performance of non-financial listed firms in Vietnam, where performance is measured 
by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Moreover, regression results for most control variables in the 
relationship with firm performance are also significant.  
 
The impact of capital structure on performance of listed banks in Vietnam are described in 
table 10, with ROA (model 1) and ROE (model 2) are used as dependent variables in 
regression models. As shown from the table, unlike non-financial firms, the impact of 
financial leverage on ROA and ROE are not consistent. Model 1 presents that the coefficient 
of the variable LEV is -0.031 and significant at the 1% level, implying that if the ratio 
between total debt and total equity of the banks increases by 1, return on assets will fall by 
0.03%, all else held equal. In comparison with the decrease of 1.9% in ROA of non-financial 
firms in table 9, the negative effect of capital structure on performance of listed banks is 
weaker. It comes as a surprise that empirical results in model 2 point out a positive 
relationship between financial leverage and ROE, which is significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient of the variable LEV is 0.453, suggesting that an increase of 1 in the ratio of total 
debt to total equity also leads to an increase of 0.45% in ROE of Vietnamese listed banks, 
holding all other variables constant. The positive influence of financial leverage on bank’s 
ROE is explainable. While a high level of debt ratio in non-financial firms might lead to 
insolvency problems, financial firms need a sufficiently high leverage level to operate (Fama 
& French, 1992). Therefore, it is reasonable to see that debt financing actively contributes to 
an efficient use of capital of banks in Vietnam, which results in higher performance.  
 
In terms of bank control variables, model 1 of table 10 shows that all bank-specific factors 
including growth (GRO), size (SIZ) and liquidity (LIQ) have positive impacts on bank’s 
ROA, the coefficients are significant at the 1% and 5% levels. Regarding macroeconomic 
variables, GDP, however, negatively affects bank’s ROA and the impact is strong at 1% 
significance level. This negative effect can be explained by the fact that growth of GDP or 
expansion of the economy is partly due to the increase in competitions among companies 
within a certain industry and general competition can lower returns of an individual firm, 
55 
 
banking sector is no exception. The coefficient of inflation variable (INF) in model 1 is 
insignificant. Results for control variables in model 2, which uses ROE as dependent 
variable, are weaker, only coefficients of size and GDP variables are significant (both are at 
1% significance level and have the same sign as in model 1). 
 
All F-tests in table 10 have p-values lower than 1% and the values of adjusted R-squared are 
relatively high, 0.588 in model 1 and 0.618 in model 2. The numbers imply that the models 
explain more than 50% of the variations in ROA and ROE of the banks.  
 
6.5. The impact of capital structure on firm performance during financial crisis 
 
Table 11 reports the impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial listed firms 
in Vietnam, where the 2008 financial crisis is taken into account. Compared to table 9, the 
presence of the dummy variable CRI does not change the results much. The impact of 
financial leverage on ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q remains negative with similar magnitude 
and at the same significance level. Most of other control variables also have the same effect 
on performance when dummy variable is introduced into the models. It is notable that the 
variable for financial crisis shows a significantly positive relationship with all performance 
variables. In other words, non-financial companies in Vietnam still did a good job, even in 
the crisis period from 2008 to 2010.  
 
Table 12 shows a different story for banks. When taking financial crisis into consideration, 
the influence of capital structure on bank performance is still similar compared to results in 
table 10. However, the crisis dummy variable CRI presents a significantly negative 
relationship with two dependent variables, which proves that banks are more affected by the 
2008 global crisis than non-financial firms. It is understandable to say that financial 
institutions are more sensitive to financial crisis. Another thing is that, while the inflation 
variable is insignificant in table 10, it statistically has impact on bank performance with the 
presence of crisis factor, this can be explained by the high correlation between financial crisis 
and inflation level, which both affect bank profitability.
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Table 11. The impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms during 
financial crisis. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms 
during financial crisis, which are estimated by panel OLS regressions. Statistics are based on annual data during 
the period 2008-2016. Model 1 reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on firm performance measured 
by return on assets (ROA). Model 2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and firm 
performance measured by return on equity (ROE). Model 3 reports the link between financial leverage (LEV) 
and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. There are six control variables: firm growth (GRO), tangibility 
(TAN), firm size (SIZ), firm age (AGE), profitability (PRO) and liquidity (LIQ). A dummy variable CRI takes 
the value of 1 for crisis period from 2008 to 2010 and 0 for the post-crisis period from 2011 to 2016. Regressions 
are estimated using the models: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (6) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (7) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (8) 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable 
ROE 
(2) 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C -5.493** 0.011 -9.211** 0.043 -0.884*** 0.000 
LEV -1.909*** 0.000 -0.871** 0.025 -0.056*** 0.000 
GRO 1.017*** 0.008 1.924** 0.018 0.013 0.660 
TAN -4.517*** 0.000 -11.048*** 0.000 -0.492*** 0.000 
SIZ 0.991*** 0.000 1.686*** 0.000 0.178*** 0.000 
AGE 0.081*** 0.000 0.099*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.000 
PRO 6.567*** 0.000 12.766*** 0.000 0.196*** 0.003 
LIQ 16.448*** 0.000 24.540*** 0.000 0.145 0.435 
CRI 2.414*** 0.000 5.629*** 0.000 0.192*** 0.000 
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.359  0.207  0.205  
F-statistic 51.930 0.000 24.745 0.000 24.479 0.000 
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Table 12. The impact of capital structure on performance of banks during financial crisis. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of banks during 
financial crisis, which are estimated by panel OLS regressions. Statistics are based on annual data during the 
period 2008-2016. Model 1 reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on bank performance measured by 
return on assets (ROA). Model 2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and bank 
performance measured by return on equity (ROE). There are three bank-specific control variables: firm growth 
(GRO), firm size (SIZ), and liquidity (LIQ); two macroeconomic control variables include gross domestic 
product (GDP) and inflation (INF). A dummy variable CRI takes the value of 1 for crisis period from 2008 to 
2010 and 0 for the post-crisis period from 2011 to 2016. Regressions are estimated using the models: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                  (9) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (10) 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable  
ROE 
(2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C 41.175*** 0.000 559.090*** 
0.000 
LEV -0.028*** 0.010 0.493*** 0.001 
GRO 0.358*** 0.001 3.198** 0.028 
SIZ 0.292*** 0.000 3.770*** 0.000 
LIQ 3.816*** 0.009 18.979 0.316 
GDP -2.067*** 0.000 -28.382*** 0.000 
INF -3.473** 0.015 -37.433** 0.044 
CRI -0.682** 0.012 -9.500*** 0.008 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.614  0.645  
F-statistic 21.186 0.000 24.091 0.000 
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6.6. Test of endogeneity  
 
Regarding the link between financial leverage and firm performance, there is a suspicion of 
endogeneity problem that traditional methods like ordinary least squares (OLS) cannot 
detect. Endogeneity problem is caused by the uncertainty about whether there is a reverse 
causality relationship existing between capital structure and firm performance (i.e. firm 
performance also has impact on capital structure decisions). Severe endogenous issues can 
cause biased and inconsistent results. Therefore, to solve this problem, this paper uses the 
generalized method of moments on panel (GMM), which are introduced by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All the above 
models will be re-estimated by the two-step system GMM estimator.  
 
Table 13 reports results of the two-step system GMM test for the impact of financial leverage 
on performance of non-financial firms. The outcomes once again confirm the negative 
relationship between financial leverage and firm performance in three models. The 
coefficients of the variable LEV are all significant at the 1% level. Empirical results also 
show that the signs of most control variables are consistent with OLS regression but there is 
slight differences in magnitude and significance level. In the specification tests of the models, 
AR(1) tests the first-order serial correlation and AR(2) tests the second-order serial 
correlation, while Hansen test analyzes the overidentifying restrictions. As table 13 reveals, 
all p-values of AR(2) tests are higher than 10%. This suggests that the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation cannot be rejected. Likewise, p-values of Hansen tests are 
also higher than 10% in model 1 and model 2, showing the null hypothesis that instrument 
variables are valid cannot be rejected. However, the null hypothesis of valid instrument 
variables is rejected in the Tobin’s Q equation.  
 
It is not surprising that empirical results of two-step system GMM in table 14 reveal 
insignificant relationships between the independent variables and bank performance 
measuring by ROA and ROE. The small sample of listed banks in Vietnam might lead to the 
inconsistency in results between GMM and OLS estimators.  
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Table 13. The impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms – Two-step 
system GMM estimator. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms, 
which are estimated by the two-step system GMM estimator. Statistics are based on annual data during the 
period 2008-2016. Model 1 reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on firm performance measured by 
return on assets (ROA). Model 2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and firm 
performance measured by return on equity (ROE). Model 3 reports the link between financial leverage (LEV) 
and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. There are six control variables: firm growth (GRO), tangibility 
(TAN), firm size (SIZ), firm age (AGE), profitability (PRO) and liquidity (LIQ). A dummy variable CRI takes 
the value of 1 for crisis period from 2008 to 2010 and 0 for the post-crisis period from 2011 to 2016. 
Instrument: (LEV) delayed t-2, the rest of the explanatory variables are exogenous.  
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable 
ROE 
(2) 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C -1.662 0.585 -5.868 0.352 -0.101 0.158 
LEV -2.514***    0.000     -4.865***     0.000     -0.041***    0.000     
GRO 0.850***    0.000      1.218*    0.062     -0.008    0.419      
TAN -3.996***    0.003      -16.654***    0.000     -0.198***    0.000     
SIZ 0.676**    0.018      2.125***    0.000      0.039***    0.000      
AGE 0.076***    0.000      0.1486***    0.000      0.002***    0.001      
PRO 3.837**    0.037      7.835**    0.014      -0.006    0.765      
LIQ 6.945***    0.001      8.009**    0.037      -0.040    0.708     
CRI 1.608***    0.000      3.914***     0.000      0.044***  0.000      
L.ROA 0.276***    0.000          
L.ROE   0.121***    0.000         
L.TOBIN’Q     0.757***    0.000      
       
AR(1) -1.57   0.115 -1.61   0.108 -2.50   0.012 
AR(2) -0.87   0.386 0.80   0.426 -1.42   0.155 
Hansen test 29.39   0.293 28.41   0.339 65.51   0.000 
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Table 14. The impact of capital structure on performance of banks – Two-step system GMM 
estimator. 
 
The table shows the results of examining the impact of capital structure on performance of banks, which are 
estimated by the two-step system GMM estimator. Statistics are based on annual data during the period 2008-
2016. Model 1 reports the effect of financial leverage (LEV) on bank performance measured by return on assets 
(ROA). Model 2 describes the relationship between financial leverage (LEV) and bank performance measured 
by return on equity (ROE). There are three bank-specific control variables: firm growth (GRO), firm size (SIZ), 
and liquidity (LIQ); two macroeconomic control variables include gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation 
(INF). A dummy variable CRI takes the value of 1 for crisis period from 2008 to 2010 and 0 for the post-crisis 
period from 2011 to 2016.  
Instrument: (LEV) delayed t-2, the rest of the explanatory variables are exogenous.  
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Variable 
Dependent variable 
ROA 
(1) 
Dependent variable  
ROE 
(2) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
 
C 46.556  0.296      587.152**    0.032      
LEV -0.037    0.515     0.168    0.897      
GRO 0.296    0.538     2.307    0.587     
SIZ 0.509*    0.085      17.234    0.521     
LIQ 10.827    0.400     277.303    0.647     
GDP -2.472    0.248     -41.021    0.196      
INF -0.840    0.876     -1.874    0.939     
CRI -0.565    0.536     -7.218    0.143     
L.ROA -0.901    0.280       
L.ROE   -0.737    0.511     
     
AR(1) 0.20   0.839 0.28   0.782 
AR(2) -0.70 0.485 -0.50 0.615 
Hansen test 0.96 1.000 2.67 1.000 
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7. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper investigates the influence of capital structure on performance of listed firms in 
Vietnam during the period 2008-2016, where capital structure is measured by the ratio of 
total debt to total equity and ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are used as indicators for firm 
performance. Additionally, due to the large difference in operation and the use of debt 
between non-financial and financial firms, this study splits data of these two sectors and runs 
empirical regressions for non-financial firms separately. However, because of the prominent 
role of banking industry in Vietnamese economy, this study also tests the efficiency of using 
debt of listed banks in Vietnam.  
 
As reported in empirical part, the results of panel OLS regressions show a negative 
relationship between financial leverage and all performance indicators of non-financial firms. 
This finding provides a warning for Vietnamese listed companies in making capital structure 
decisions that a high level of debt can reduce profitability. Moreover, other control variables 
including firm growth, tangibility, firm size, firm age, profitability and liquidity also have 
effects on firm performance. By taking the 2008 global financial crisis into consideration, 
the negative impact of capital structure on performance of non-financial firms remains 
unchanged and empirical results also reveal that the crisis did not seriously affect 
performance of those firms.  
 
Panel OLS regressions also present a negative effect of financial leverage on ROA of listed 
banks. However the relationship between financial leverage and bank’s ROE is positive, 
indicating an efficient use of debt. Regarding the impact of macroeconomic factors on bank 
performance, GDP negatively affects both ROA and ROE, which is justified by the increase 
in competition when economy grows. Moreover, when the dummy variable of the 2008 
financial crisis is introduced into the models, empirical results report a similar relationship 
between capital structure and bank performance. However, unlike non-financial firms, banks 
are more influenced by the crisis.  
62 
 
To cope with the problem of endogeneity, this paper uses the two-step system GMM 
estimator to test all the models again. According to empirical outcomes, the negative impact 
of financial leverage on performance of non-financial firms is confirmed. Especially, the 
effect of capital structure on ROA and ROE is very strong. However, the link between 
financial leverage and bank performance becomes insignificant in GMM tests. This might be 
due to the small sample of listed banks in Vietnam, which leads to insufficient data for 
analysis.  
 
Finally, this paper still has some limitations. In addition to the ratio of total debt to total 
equity, other factors like short-term debt and long-term debt can be used to determine proxies 
for capital structure. To strengthen the results of empirical models, other control variables 
such as tax, risk, dividend or cash flow can be added. Moreover, due to the lack of financial 
data, research results are still limited. A larger sample can be employed to test the relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance in Vietnam again.  
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